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SUMMARY* 
This paper argues that the New Economy paradigm and the interests of 
the more advanced EU Member states dominate current thinking on EU 
industrial and regional policy. European integration is driving a political 
economy of regionalism that—far more than traditional divisions between 
labour and capital—decisively defines the contours of “economic interests” 
in the New Europe and has the most significant impact on EU, national 
and subnational policy approaches. The New Economy paradigm is driving 
a radical shift in EU policy from cohesion or redistribution toward innova-
tion promotion and affects distributional struggles at the EU, national and 
subnational levels. This shift has important implications for future EU in-
dustrial and regional development policy goals. On the one hand, shifting 
strategies pose significant challenges at the national and subnational levels. 
While political decentralization dominates current discourse, national gov-
ernments—in particular perhaps in the New Member states (NMS’s)—are 
more likely to favour centralized control over national and regional spend-
ing priorities. On the other hand, seemingly at the expense of the NMS’s, 
the increasing concentration of EU funding on a large number of less ad-
vanced economies is eroding the policy’s traditional support basis. 
 
                                                 
* Previous versions of this and a related paper were presented at the International Studies 
Association meetings (San Diego, March 22nd–25th, 2006), the Midwestern Political Science 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reform of European Union (EU) regional 
and industrial policy has been discussed at 
length in recent years. The run-up to the 
completion of the 2007–2013 Framework 
Perspective is in part responsible. Much 
effort has been expended to demonstrate 
both how EU funds might best be put to 
use, as well as to argue that the shape 
and form of previous funding may not be 
well-suited to promoting long-term eco-
nomic growth and development in today’s 
Europe. The Lisbon Agenda and in par-
ticular the Sapir Report1 have launched a 
debate that may forever change the face 
of EU regional policy. In particular, this 
debate addresses what I shall call the di-
vide between innovation-oriented and redis-
tributive policy goals. Part of a much 
broader and more general re-orientation 
in economic policy thinking, this debate 
lays bare much of the core of current EU 
distributional struggles and raises questions 
about the future outlook for EU regional 
and industrial policy more generally. 
The shift from redistributive to innova-
tion-oriented thinking parallels a broad 
range of shifts taking place both within 
the EU framework and elsewhere. For the 
EU, the manifestation of such change can 
be traced back to gradual reforms of EU 
industrial policy and the rise of controls 
on state aid spending. The shift from sec-
toral support (i.e. direct subsidies to firms 
or declining economic sectors) toward 
spending on more horizontal and universal 
policy goals—in particular on physical and 
human capital (i.e. infrastructure, educa-
tion/training and R&D)—was initiated with 
reforms of EU industrial policy goals in 
the early 90’s. In parallel, EU policy has 
progressively circumscribed the arena of 
                                                 
1 For more on the Lisbon Agenda, see European 
Commission (2000). For the Sapir Report, see 
European Commission (2003). 
state intervention at the national level and 
has used competition policy, restrictions on 
state aids and even the Economic and 
Monetary Union’s (EMU’s) convergence 
criteria to promote compliance with the 
general paradigm shift in industrial policy. 
Though tempting to think of this shift 
as a movement in the neo-liberal direction 
commensurate with the rollback of the 
state and an acceptance of the predomi-
nance of the market,2 such characteriza-
tions of the re-writing of EU industrial 
and regional policy fail to comprehend 
that the Lisbon Agenda and the Sapir Re-
port promote a broad re-focusing of the 
role of state intervention—not its demise. 
In concert, the Lisbon Agenda and the 
Sapir Report represent attempts to reform 
EU funding and are generally supportive 
of a positive role for state intervention. 
This should not suggest that the strategic 
thinking underlying these documents repre-
sents just more of the same old industrial 
policy framework long characteristic of EU 
economies. In important ways, the combi-
nation of these (and successor) documents 
represents a paradigm shift with the po-
tential for a significant and long-term im-
pact on the future of EU growth man-
agement. 
Two questions form the basic focus of 
this paper. The first concerns how best to 
explain these gradual shifts in policy. As 
argued in this paper, current reforms in 
the practice of EU regional development 
and industrial policy should be seen in the 
context of New Economy models of eco-
nomic development. While others are 
tempted to see changes in the EU frame-
work as either a response to globalization 
or a consequence of European integration 
and the relative decline in labour power, 
this paper argues instead that the major 
impetus of these reforms is best under-
stood within the context of models of eco-
nomic geography and endogenous growth. 
                                                 
2 A broad range of literature appears to make this 
assumption (see for example: Hooghe, 1998; 
Streeck, 1999; and the neo-Gramscian literature: 
Apeldoorn, 2002; Bieler, 2003; Bohle, 2006). 
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This approach emphasizes the importance 
of sub-national regions in industrial and 
regional development policy, as well as the 
knowledge-based economy and the poten-
tial for external increasing returns.3 These 
models deeply influence how intellectuals 
and governments currently think about 
economic policy-making and provide the 
groundwork for this potential shift in eco-
nomic strategy. However, the distributional 
impact of such models is not neutral, 
leading to significant public debates over 
the re-nationalization of public spending 
(read subsidiarity), political decentralization 
vs. state-centred control and the appropri-
ate use and targets of EU-funding. Fur-
ther, states and groups within states are 
likely to promote those models that best 
reflect their interests. 
The second question focuses on what 
this means for the future of EU regional 
policy goals and in particular the interests 
of the less developed economies in the 
European Union. Though the Sapir Report 
itself did not envision the elimination of 
regional policy—the report recommends 
regional funding be “concentrated” on the 
less developed states (European Commis-
sion, 2003: 6)—the basic question raised is 
ultimately how to shift EU spending from 
redistributive to more productive and in-
novation-oriented policy goals. Though one 
can question the specifically redistributive 
content of previous EU regional policy,4 
the tenacity with which the Directorate 
                                                 
3 I adopt Krugman’s (1991) language here and 
distinguish in particular between increasing returns 
resulting from economies of scale and external 
increasing returns generated by the geographic 
concentration of economic activity. Only the poten-
tial for the latter example of increasing returns is 
the focus of this analysis. 
4 See e.g. Dunford (2005: 977), Hall (2005: 970). 
Indeed many have argued that the functional-
redistributional content of the SCF’s is overwhelmed 
by distributional politics. Some see the SCF as side-
payments in order to secure support for deeper 
integration (Carrubba, 1997; Lange, 1993; Marks, 
1992). Moreover, it is tempting to point to the 
quite broad distribution of funds across multiple 
states and claim that politics rather than variation 
in the level of economic development or more 
functional models of economic development are the 
principal explanation. 
General for Regional Policy (DGRegio) has 
insisted upon the compatibility of Lisbon 
and Regional Policy goals is alone sugges-
tive of the divide between potentially di-
vergent developmental aims.5 As argued 
herein, the goal of achieving a productive 
and innovation-oriented economy competes 
and is potentially at odds with the goals 
of cohesion and redistribution. 
In this general context, the more the 
EU broadens its membership base to a 
broad range of less developed economies,6 
the more likely it becomes that competing 
claims placed on EU resources will be 
rendered contradictory and problematic. 
As the EU increases in size and economic 
disparity, structural and cohesion fund 
(SCF) policies become further concentrated 
on a select group of countries. If cross-
country economic disparities were less 
pronounced, a much wider range of coun-
tries would presumably benefit from the 
EU’s SCF’s thereby strengthening public 
support. But as disparities increase and 
more and more funds are concentrated on 
less developed states and regions, fewer 
and fewer core states are able to take 
advantage of the SCF’s and the net con-
tributor status of some states thus weighs 
more heavily. This gradually removes a 
broad range of more advanced states and 
regions from the policy’s support base and 
this in turn may erode future support for 
EU redistributional mechanisms. Though the 
consequences of such trends are naturally 
difficult to predict, such policy features 
may well begin to wither away as the EU 
grows in size. 
                                                 
5 This objective has occupied much of the current 
public relations work of DGRegio Commissioner 
Danuta Hübner (see e.g. the series of speeches 
posted on the DGRegio website in early March, 
2006). Moreover, DGRegio commissioned a sub-
stantial study on the topic completed by the Danish 
Technology Institute (Danish Technology Institute, 
2005). 
6 Just how many enlargements remain on the hori-
zon and what geographic contours will define the 
future borders of the EU remains to be seen. For 
the time-being, the EU has undertaken to negotiate 
with Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia. But many 
potential future members stand in the wings. 
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This paper proceeds as follows. The 
first section provides an overview of the 
factors explaining the general paradigm 
shift in EU industrial and regional devel-
opment policy. The second section analyzes 
the impact of this shift on the 2007–2013 
Framework Perspective. A brief discussion 
and conclusions follow. 
PARADIGM SHIFT? COHESION, 
REDISTRIBUTION AND 
INNOVATION PROMOTION 
Resource struggles (in particular over 
capital) and re-distributional struggles (in 
particular over fiscal expenditure) are des-
tined to remain strongly intertwined with 
future debates and policy-making struggles 
in the New Europe. Textbook analyses of 
international trade suggest that the costs 
of economic adjustment can easily be 
overcome by the redistributive transfer of 
resources from winners to losers. Politically 
this has always been difficult to achieve 
(Rogowski, 1989). Why this happens has 
long troubled political economists. In the 
EU context, rather than redistribute and 
mitigate the costs arising from economic 
integration, the recent accession of 10 New 
Member States (NMS) has instead been 
used to shift the burden of adjustment to 
the Central and East European states. Few 
EU redistributional tools were used—in 
particular in the early years of accession 
and enlargement—to dampen the blow of 
economic adjustment in Central and East-
ern Europe and much has been done to 
protect Western markets, thereby increas-
ing the burden on Central and East Euro-
pean economies (Ellison, 2006, 2005a, 
2005b). 
Competition between states over scarce 
resources (in particular capital) and EU 
redistributional funding (in particular the 
SCF’s and the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP)) motivates the attempt to retain 
what little direct financial advantage states 
receive from EU membership and to re-
duce potential losses. The institutional 
structure of the European Union however 
tends to reinforce the position of the 
large, economically more advanced states 
over that of smaller, less advanced states. 
This makes it possible—at least in terms 
of economic adjustment costs—for the lar-
ger and more economically advanced 
states to reap more of the rewards while 
the smaller and economically less advanced 
states bear a greater share of the burden 
of economic adjustment. Thus the coinci-
dence of political and economic power is 
likely to lead to less than favourable out-
comes for smaller and—in particular—less 
advanced states in the EU.7 
Such claims may seem strident and even 
out of character with an EU literature that 
suggests—in the aggregate—that all coun-
tries benefit from European integration. 
The intergovernmentalist literature however 
has long implied the likelihood that the 
gains from European integration are at 
best likely to be uneven, though it has 
seldom investigated this likelihood in great 
detail.8 Given variation in the relative eco-
nomic and political power of states, policy 
outcomes should presumably reflect that 
political dynamic. Thus while—in the ag-
gregate—we should generally expect all 
states to gain from European integration, 
we still might expect some states to gain 
more than others. Side-payments have long 
been conceived as the mechanism by which 
more powerful states have been able to 
buy-off or compensate those likely to win 
                                                 
7 This may seem surprising to some, since smaller 
states are often seen as winners in the EU context. 
As more trade dependent states they gain from 
market integration with their fellow EU Member 
States and their weighted qualified majority voting 
power—relative at least to their population shares 
in the EU—in the Council of Ministers has tradi-
tionally been greater. Such arguments however ig-
nore both the role of blocking minorities (more 
easily manipulated by the larger states) and the 
population rule introduced with the Nice Treaty—
which again greatly strengthened the political 
weight of the larger states (Ellison, 2005a). 
8 See in particular Moravcsik (1999) and Moravc-
sik and Vachudova (2003). 
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less from economic integration (see e.g. 
Lange, 1993; Marks, 1992). Moreover, un-
certainty and the substitution of perceived 
for real gains greatly increases the range 
of potential variation in the impact of pol-
icy outcomes, making it possible that some 
states lose not only on individual features 
of European integration but also in the 
aggregate (Ellison, 2006; Ellison and Hus-
sain, 2003). 
New Economy models designate the mix 
of endogenous growth and economic ge-
ography models popularized in particular 
by Krugman (1991). The impetus for this 
approach lies in attempts to explain and 
model technological progress and its im-
pact on economic growth—otherwise typi-
cally assumed to be external or exogenous 
to the process of economic development. 
Both the endogenous growth and economic 
geography schools explain technological 
progress as a function of dynamics inter-
nal to more competitive economies and 
regions.9 Endogeneity implies that techno-
logical progress is itself a function of the 
factors driving economic growth. Economic 
geography models focus on the geographic 
nature of the localized factors generating 
technological progress, as well as factors 
limiting the geographical range over which 
knowledge or technological progress is 
spread. 
New Economy models cast new light on 
the geography and driving forces of eco-
nomic growth and development. Observa-
tions from this literature have begun to 
have repercussions both for theorizing 
about the shape and substance of EU, na-
tional and subnational-level regional policy 
tools and goals,10 as well as the institu-
tional framework within which they are 
formulated. One of the principal contribu-
tions of the New Economy Models with 
respect to regional policy and national (or 
                                                 
9 I draw here most explicitly from Gardiner et al. 
(2005: 1049-1050). For recent work, see also 
Brakman et al. (2005) and Baldwin and Martin 
(2004). This approach has generated lively interest 
since Krugman’s initial publication. 
10 See, in particular, Bachtler and Wishlade (2005), 
Martin (2003), and Baldwin and Martin (2004). 
supranational) development goals is to 
question the nature of the linkage between 
regional, subnational development policy 
and the nature and structure of economic 
growth and development. A broad scale 
rewriting of industrial and regional devel-
opment goals has been afoot in the Euro-
pean Union for some time. Intentionally or 
not, the Sapir Report dealt a considerable 
blow to previous regional policy initiatives. 
Since that time, DGRegio appears pinned 
between the competing agendas of regional 
development and the onslaught of growth 
and competitiveness and Lisbon Agenda 
policy orientations. A book-length Danish 
Technological Institute (2005) study com-
missioned by DGRegio was dedicated to 
exploring the compatibility between re-
gional development and Lisbon goals. Most 
recently, Regional Policy Commissioner Da-
nuta Hübner has spent considerable time 
giving speeches on the significance of Lis-
bon goals for regional development.11 
Theories of endogenous growth and 
concepts of regional clustering (or the ag-
glomeration of economic activity) promote 
an increasing emphasis on the potential to 
facilitate regional, geographically-localized 
spillover effects. Considered innovation 
promoting and technology producing, these 
localized effects are thought to lead to 
higher economic returns based on the ex-
ploitation of knowledge-related scarcities. 
As a result, the nature and structure of 
policies directed toward national macro-
level subnational regional development 
goals has undergone considerable revision. 
In particular, European industrial policy 
goals exhibit a gradual shift away from 
their previous sectoral structure and direct 
forms of redistribution (e.g. subsidies to 
firms and the support of declining indus-
tries, income support and the like). In-
stead, emphasis is now placed on more 
horizontal forms of assistance with broad 
economic application. In particular, such 
forms of government intervention focus on 
the role of physical and human capital (or 
                                                 
11 See, for example, the series of speeches listed on 
DGRegio’s website given in early March 2006.  
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infrastructure and training/education), and 
on the role of other innovation enhancing 
policies (e.g. R&D).12 
Phrased in this manner, the radical shift 
in development strategies and goals is only 
moderately perceptible. Yet, what is under 
attack is the long tradition of EU policy 
orientations that have tended to focus 
more resources on agriculture, declining 
industries and lagging regions.13 As many 
appear to argue, if Europe is to become 
more productive, it must shift more of its 
resources to more productive economic 
activities. Following Streeck (1999), this is 
part of a more generalizable phenomenon 
occurring at the level of the state as well. 
Streeck emphasizes the current national 
government practice of promoting produc-
tive assets (physical and human capital, 
education, R&D, infrastructure, etc.) at the 
expense of redistributional spending (trans-
fer payments, unemployment insurance and 
other forms of income maintenance). The 
basic emphasis is similar. Competitiveness 
concerns drive a broad re-orientation of 
state-level strategies of economic manage-
ment. Thus this phenomenon is occurring 
at both national and supranational levels 
of policy-making in the EU. 
Though the specifically regional charac-
ter of this shifting policy orientation is 
perhaps less obvious on the surface, New 
Economy models in particular prompt a 
comparatively radical rethinking of the 
compatibility of national and regional pol-
icy goals. These models have—in particu-
lar—focused attention both on the impor-
tance of agglomeration economies and 
their clustering of economic activity and 
on the importance of regions insofar as 
such clustering tends to exhibit a particu-
larly regional character. However, one 
should not confuse (as some of the litera-
                                                 
12 Early discussion of the shift toward horizontal 
measures can be found in “Industrial Policy in an 
Open and Competitive Environment: Guidelines for 
a Community Approach” (COM(90) 556) and “An 
Industrial Competitiveness Policy for the EU” 
(COM(94) 319 final). 
13 This point is clear from the Sapir report (Euro-
pean Commission, 2003: 79, 126). 
ture appears to do) the focus on the re-
gional clusters of economic activity with 
the previous focus on regional policy and 
regional development in the less advanced 
regions of Europe. The one strategy is fo-
cused on promoting dynamic regional 
growth—in particular in regions that al-
ready exhibit a positive propensity to sup-
port such growth—while the other is more 
clearly focused on an attempt to reverse 
patterns of economic decline or stagnation 
in lagging regions. The outcome is likely 
to be an increasing degree of competition 
between growth promoting and cohesion 
inducing public policy goals or, as 
phrased at the outset of this paper, be-
tween innovation-oriented and redistributive 
policy goals. 
Brakman et al. (2005) in particular 
note the considerable regularity in the 
structure of regional economic growth and 
disparities. EU and national-level regional 
policy has frequently met with failure. Sig-
nificant differences in the level of eco-
nomic development persist across Europe’s 
regions, despite repeated and long-term 
efforts to turn them around (e.g. the Ital-
ian Mezzogiorno and East Germany), pro-
pelling many to ask why EU or national 
level resources should be allocated to poli-
cies that do not always seem to bear 
fruit.14 A number of authors thus point to 
equity vs. efficiency trade-offs with respect 
to national and regional economic policy 
goals (Brakman et al., 2005; Lackenbauer, 
2004; Bachtler et al., 2003; Martin, 1999). 
In their view, if agglomeration is crucial 
to the nature and character of economic 
development, then transferring resources to 
less developed regions is likely to slow the 
rate of economic development in advanced 
regions and accordingly may even fail to 
achieve their desired effects in less ad-
vanced regions. The diversion of resources 
to economically less advanced regions may 
thus slow rather than speed up the proc-
ess of economic development. 
                                                 
14 For recent overviews of the literature on the 
relative success of regional policy, see Jouen (2005: 
Annex) and Funck and Pizzati (2003). 
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The likely outcome of such observations 
is either an interest in revising policy ap-
proaches directed toward less developed 
regions or an interest in reducing gov-
ernment intervention in regions that are 
on the decline and increasing it in regions 
on the rise.15 Moreover, it is not uncom-
mon in this literature to come across the 
observation that promoting growth in the 
more developed regions is likely to pro-
mote growth in the less advanced regions 
(see Brakman et al., 2005; Scott, 2000; 
Storper, 1992). As Scott argues, “geo-
economic space” is made up of a “central 
nucleus” and a “hinterland” of variable 
size (2000: 48). Implicit in his argumenta-
tion is the notion that the welfare of the 
hinterland or more remote regions—
though excruciatingly unclear where such 
regions begin and end16—is dependent 
upon and pulled along by the welfare of 
the core regions. In this regard, the New 
Economy disadvantages redistributive policy 
and favours more targeted and potentially 
more supply-side oriented policies focused 
on the development of human and physical 
capital (education, R&D and infrastruc-
ture). In doing so, it sparks fears of its 
seemingly conservative edge. This policy 
orientation ultimately threatens to diminish 
not only the specifically redistributive, but 
also the regional content of regional de-
velopment policy.  
Efficiency motives provide strong incen-
tives for both national governments and 
regions to exercise greater control over 
economic development strategies. For na-
tional governments, both EU-based and 
national-level regional development strate-
gies—in particular those focused on cohe-
sion and redistribution—potentially drain 
resources away from more advanced states 
and regions. While all states are broadly 
                                                 
15 Brakman et al. (2005), for example, explicitly 
make this recommendation. 
16 One way of thinking about this problem is to 
ask how it fits the European case which Scott does 
not directly address. For example, should one think 
of central nuclei and a hinterland at the national 
or European level? The relevant unit of analysis 
here is of course terribly important in terms of its 
policy implications. 
similar in this regard, the level of eco-
nomic development across states generates 
variation in policy interests. For more ad-
vanced states, such observations drive an 
interest in promoting Lisbon-type objectives 
over more traditional forms of regional 
development. Lisbon-type objectives, how-
ever, embody implicit challenges, both to 
the interests of less developed states and 
regions and to the future of regional pol-
icy more generally. For less advanced 
states, regional development policies are 
clearly preferable over Lisbon-type goals 
where this means portends a greater con-
centration of funding on less developed 
states. At the same time however, in the 
domestic arena the specifically regional 
focus of regional development strategies 
may potentially draw resources away from 
emerging economic clusters and potentially 
upset the fine balance between regional 
and national level economic restructuring 
and overall economic development. If the 
dispersion of resources designed to pro-
mote overall development leads to an 
overall decline in rates of economic 
growth, national governments will then 
presumably favour agglomeration promot-
ing policies over regional redistribution. 
Less advanced states in particular are thus 
faced with significant equity vs. efficiency 
tradeoffs and are torn between the objec-
tives of cohesion/redistribution and innova-
tion promotion. 
Due to efficiency concerns, states in 
particular are likely to be torn between 
innovation promotion and cohe-
sion/redistribution and are also likely to 
favour greater centralization in the institu-
tional structure that oversees the making 
of economic management policies at the 
national level. Increasing demands for de-
centralization (whether their origin is the 
Commission or the regions themselves), in 
particular over EU funds, are likely to be 
paralleled by increasing national govern-
ment attempts to maintain control—at least 
as long as politically feasible. Less ad-
vanced states in particular have strong 
incentives to side with growth-club con-
stituencies in the more advanced regions, 
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since these are presumably more likely to 
attract important resources for the state—
in particular government revenues and 
improved employment. 
The role of the EU and the subnational 
regional level in attempting to foster 
greater decentralization at the regional 
level may well be rendered somewhat am-
biguous in this general context.17 The cur-
rent trend—even in the framework of EU 
funding and the institutional management 
of these funds—seems to run in the oppo-
site direction. For one, the EU has begun 
shifting more of the redistributional fund-
ing away from the structural and toward 
the cohesion elements of the SCF. This has 
the impact of increasing the role and im-
portance of the state over the regions. 
Moreover, while DGRegio has tended to 
emphasize the importance of regions, cur-
rent efforts likewise place considerable 
emphasis on the coordination of regional 
and state-level economic strategies,18 once 
again pushing the emphasis toward the 
state level. For another, EU co-financing 
requirements ultimately favour national 
level institutions, since approval of such 
funds tends to depend on national or min-
                                                 
17 For many reasons, DGRegio is likely to find it-
self in a considerable state of turmoil. For one, 
such a paradigm shift ultimately entails shifts in 
the policy constituencies and entrenched interests 
built up over time for the purposes of institutional 
survival. At the same time, both the phenomenon 
of paradigm shift and the EU’s changing member-
ship basis distinctly threaten older constituencies. In 
this regard, DGRegio is likely to be torn between 
competing interests. Moreover, some of this process 
is likely to be mirrored at the level of the state. 
The Hungarian case presents an interesting exam-
ple. The current National Development Office is 
now likely to be elevated to the status of a na-
tional ministry, completely side-stepping the existing 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Devel-
opment (from which half of its staff is now ex-
pected to be laid off in the context of the gov-
ernment’s 2006 New Balance austerity program). 
18 The recommendation of the Danish Technological 
Institute’s (2005) report, for example, strongly rec-
ommended that in order to pool the synergies of 
regional and state-level economic development 
strategies—and in particular in order to make Lis-
bon type strategies more compatible with regional 
development goals—it was important to coordinate 
and align them.  
istry-level support for individual projects.19 
Finally, despite an initial interest in greater 
decentralization, during the period 2004-
2006 the coordination and management of 
EU SCF funding was primarily left up to 
CEE states. Left to their own devices—in 
particular with the advantage of increased 
political centralization—states and national 
governments can more easily decide how 
best to allocate resources across regions. 
Thus the EU’s indecisiveness and ambigu-
ous approach to the politics of regional 
development allocates much of the political 
struggle over economic policy strategies to 
the national arena. 
Efficiency motives are also likely to give 
rise to intense national level conflicts over 
resource distribution. The New Economy 
view of what drives economic growth 
raises explicit challenges for regions. Eco-
nomically more advanced regions, on the 
one hand, are likely to lobby national gov-
ernments in favour of regional develop-
ment strategies that favour agglomeration 
and the development of greater innovation 
potential. Such regions may be at the fore-
front of national-level autonomy drives, 
but are less likely to be strong supporters 
either of national or supranational EU-level 
redistribution toward less developed re-
gions. On the other hand, insofar as EU 
membership provides such regions with 
greater political autonomy and the ability 
to trade freely with the other regions of 
Europe, they are likely to be strong sup-
porters of European integration.20 Eco-
nomically less advanced regions, on the 
other hand,—in particular in the less ad-
vanced states—are likely to become strong 
supporters both of more traditional forms 
of national-level and EU support and in 
                                                 
19 Co-financing tools—for example the EU’s 50% 
co-financing requirement for structural funds is 
seen as a mechanism for forcing correspondence 
between regional and national level interests in 
economic development (Bachtler et al., 2003: 16).  
20 This is the beauty of Alesina and Spolaore’s 
(1997) argument  that as nations become more 
economically integrated—or as free trade deepens 
and becomes more widespread—there are increas-
ing incentives for regions to seek greater political 
autonomy from nation states. 
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particular of the EU redistributional 
framework. In addition, they may poten-
tially become strong advocates of political 
decentralization. Advocating political 
autonomy, however, is less likely in a con-
text where such regions are dependent 
upon the approval and resources of na-
tional governments—in particular for co-
financing of EU-funded projects. But in the 
context of national government support 
for more advanced regional economic clus-
ters—less advanced regions—
notwithstanding the ambiguities noted 
above with respect to EU-level loyalties21—
may eventually see the EU as a haven for 
the defense of regional interests and as a 
vehicle through which they can gain 
greater political control over resources. 
At the same time, there are important 
caveats to the New Economy approach. For 
one, faster economic growth in Europe’s 
peripheries appears as a potential contra-
diction to New Economy models and pro-
vides some support for neoclassical ap-
proaches. Slow growth in Europe’s core 
has been one of the driving forces behind 
the interest in re-orienting European policy 
approaches toward the Lisbon agenda. 
While it is beyond the parameters of this 
paper to respond adequately to this de-
bate, even some of the more avid and as-
tute proponents of New Economy ap-
proaches provide occasionally contradictory 
data with surprisingly little commentary. 
Martin, for example, builds an argument 
around the New Economy approach but 
then provides data to suggest that the pe-
ripheries grew more rapidly over the pe-
riod 1995–1999 (2003: 22).22 
Others have likewise noted that al-
though less advanced regions are fre-
                                                 
21 To the extent that the European Commission 
continues to lean in the direction of national-level 
control of EU-funding, this may greatly limit the 
ability to and of course interest of less advanced 
regions in promoting their ties to the European 
Union. 
22 Martin does argue that while there is economic 
convergence across states, there is economic diver-
gence across Europe’s regions. However he essen-
tially neglects the larger question of what explains 
convergence across the states of Europe. 
quently assumed to benefit less from eco-
nomic integration and EU membership, the 
evidence to support this claim is at best 
mixed. Thus Hooghe and Keating, for ex-
ample, voice a degree of skepticism about 
the core-periphery model (1994: 369). Such 
findings generate further uncertainty in 
the calculation of which regions are likely 
to win and lose from the process of eco-
nomic integration and EU membership. 
Moreover, some countries and regions 
have met with considerably more success 
than others, suggesting that other factors 
also play a role—in particular, the specific 
institutional features of individual countries 
and regions. Variation in the economic 
success of Irish, Spanish, Portuguese and 
Greek regions, for example, is difficult to 
explain only on the basis of EU-funding. 
Admittedly, the above analysis flies in 
the face of more conventional views of 
what is driving the re-orientation of na-
tional and EU-level regional and industrial 
development policy orientations. Some ap-
pear to see the Lisbon Agenda as an at-
tempt to rebuild a compassionate consen-
sus around the social market economy 
and the European Social Model—later 
blown apart by the Kok Report in favour 
a more economically deterministic ap-
proach to development.23 This may how-
ever fully misconceive the parameters of 
the current economic and political debate. 
The view expressed herein suggests instead 
that the Lisbon Agenda, as an explicit 
representation of the New Economy logic, 
explicitly challenges the core assumptions 
of the European social market economy—
in particular its emphasis on a cohesion 
producing redistributive agenda as op-
posed to the goals of innovation promo-
tion. Moreover, while others construe the 
debate in terms of the decline of coordi-
nated market economies, in particular in 
the framework of globalization and Euro-
pean integration (Hooghe, 1998; Streeck 
and Schmitter, 1991; Streeck, 1999), this 
paper argues instead that the paradigm 
                                                 
23 See e.g. Zsuzsa Ferge’s editorial: “A fejlesztési 
terv és a társadalom”, (Népszabadság, Augustus 
30th, 2006). 
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shift in economic thought is the ultimate 
cause of much of the attempted re-
orientation of economic policy tools from 
redistribution to innovation promotion. 
Whether or not such a thorough reori-
entation or European industrial and re-
gional development policy will succeed de-
pends on the slowly changing structure of 
EU regional development constituencies and 
the interests and relative power of national 
governments. As argued at the outset, the 
longevity of EU regional development poli-
cies is largely a function of the relative 
disparities in economic development across 
the EU member states (the greater the 
economic disparities, the more likely such 
policies will be short-lived), of the relative 
policy inertia affecting much of EU redis-
tributional policies and of the degree to 
which various actors are favoured by the 
EU institutional decision-making structure. 
The following section analyzes the likeli-
hood of further policy reform on the basis 
of the 2000–2006 and 2007–2013 SCF 
allocations. 
THE POLITICS OF EU REGIONAL 
AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
REFORM 
As argued above, much of the debate 
over industrial and regional policy in the 
EU is in part driven by a desire to find 
ways of promoting national, supranational 
and subnational economic development ob-
jectives in Europe when the lion’s share of 
EU funding is devoted to agricultural (i.e. 
sectoral) and regional targets. Though this 
section cannot adequately address the 
shape of interests at the subnational 
level—this has been left to a later paper—
it does investigate why such strong chal-
lenges to EU regional policy have emerged 
at this point in time. This analysis is then 
followed by a discussion and analysis of 
the 2007–2013 Framework Perspective. 
For one, slow economic growth in the 
advanced core of Europe has inspired 
considerable interest in a focus on gov-
ernment strategies that are more likely to 
reinvigorate existing patterns of economic 
growth and development. Moreover, previ-
ous projects intended to kick start Euro-
pean economic growth—in particular the 
Single Market program and the project of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)—
have long been completed and no longer 
occupy a major part of the EU’s agenda. 
Further, the constraints of EMU, the con-
vergence criteria and the Stability and 
Growth Pact—in particular in the absence 
of a more fully-developed EU fiscal tool—
may lead the more advanced EU member 
states to seek alternative measures for 
funding regional development.  
Debates on the relative value of EU re-
gional vs. national level industrial and re-
gional development policy likewise emerged 
as the EU braved the enlargement and 
more and more EU resources were pro-
gressively concentrated on a large number 
of less developed economies. In particular, 
the Eastern enlargement’s statistical effect 
has resulted in the loss of structural and 
cohesion fund eligibility in most of the 
former cohesion and other old EU Mem-
ber states, further promoting renewed de-
bate.24  
Strategic thinking on the best ways to 
promote European growth has further 
been strongly influenced by the above 
models of economic geography and en-
dogenous growth. The Lisbon Agenda in 
particular begins to re-orient the EU’s fo-
cus toward national and supranational-
level policy frameworks with potentially 
growth promoting or efficiency enhancing 
features and to re-direct it away from 
regional policies that have a more redis-
tributional or compensatory character—
                                                 
24 The “statistical effect” refers to the former bene-
ficiaries of the structural and cohesion funds who 
are currently being pushed above the 75% and 
90% eligibility barriers due to the inclusion of a 
significantly large number of less developed econo-
mies in the EU’s average GDP per capita. 
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correcting in particular for regional dis-
parities. 
The mix of these pressures creates in-
centives for states to pursue quite different 
strategies of regional development. Rather 
than transfer resources to the less ad-
vanced NMS’s, many of which are already 
growing at a good clip, political expedi-
ence—in particular with respect to the 
domestic political context—suggests it is 
wiser to find ways to fund rapid innova-
tion and technological change in the do-
mestic framework. In important ways, this 
is precisely what the more advanced states 
have done. Given the failure to shift a 
significant amount of EU spending over to 
the Lisbon Agenda (and thus presumably 
away from the SCF’s), the more advanced 
states in particular have lobbied to reduce 
overall EU spending.25 Moreover, at the 
domestic level, individual states have begun 
to overhaul their regional spending priori-
ties26 and to revise their thinking on the 
advantages of EU level spending.27 
For the more advanced states, the Lis-
bon goals must be seen as a mechanism 
for re-orienting EU-level spending priorities 
and thereby re-directing some of their fo-
cus to the more advanced states. In this 
regard, an emphasis on Lisbon-type goals 
is likely to mean that the NMS’s must 
share more of the EU’s resources with the 
more advanced states. While the Sapir Re-
port did not explicitly propose more re-
sources be dedicated to the more ad-
vanced states, early versions of the revised 
2007–2013 Framework Perspective in par-
ticular provided for a significant shift in 
spending toward the strategies of growth 
                                                 
25 The single most important document in this re-
gard is the Joint Letter signed by the UK, France, 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden that 
proposed the imposition of this 1% ceiling on EU 
expenditure (December 15th, 2003). 
26 For a critical approach to the UK case, see 
Fothergill (2005).  
27 The UK’s vision of future EU regional policy is 
expressed in A Modern Regional Policy for the 
United Kingdom and recommends both concen-
trated EU regional policy spending on the least 
advanced states along with a re-nationalization of 
regional policy for the more advanced states (De-
partment of Trade and Industry, 2003: 25-8). 
and competitiveness (see also Jouen, 2005: 
11). 
The less developed NMS’s, on the other 
hand, are likely to favour SCF funding 
over Lisbon strategy type funding. The 
problem is not so much that the Lisbon 
Agenda is counter to their needs. Elements 
of the Lisbon Agenda may help the CEEC’s 
to firm up ties in particular between do-
mestic and foreign firms and to further 
promote the development of innovation-
oriented economies. But in this respect the 
NMS’s face diverse sets of interests. On 
the one hand, they would like to develop 
greater potential for increasing return’s 
type industries and economic sectors. As 
intended by the Lisbon Agenda, the pro-
motion of R&D is one key means of 
achieving this goal. On the other hand, the 
CEEC’s likewise have declining regions that 
are greatly in need of more traditional 
forms of regional support oriented in par-
ticular toward the modernization of infra-
structure, the improvement of skill levels 
and efforts to boost overall levels of (for-
eign) investment—e.g. through the use of 
targeted investment promotion strategies 
favoured occasionally even by more ad-
vanced states.28 Here, Lisbon type strate-
gies may be less suited to regional levels 
of economic development. 
The mix of industry needs of more and 
less advanced states and regions may help 
to explain much of the divergence of in-
terest in EU policy goals. More advanced 
states and regions are far more likely to 
have strong interests in Lisbon type strate-
gies and goals—in particular investment in 
infrastructure, R&D and human capital. 
Less advanced states and regions, on the 
other hand, are far more likely to depend 
upon infrastructure investments and in-
vestment promotion schemes for attracting 
firms (see Ellison, 2005b). While human 
capital investments may contribute to eco-
nomic development and potentially attract 
capital, the less developed the region, the 
                                                 
28 See e.g. www.Euractiv.com: “German Government 
Says it Knows Best what is Good for Growth” 
(April 12th, 2006). 
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more questionable the advantages. In this 
respect, less advanced countries and re-
gions attempting to pursue more advanced 
levels of economic development may ulti-
mately be constrained by EU development 
policy. This can occur on multiple levels: 
either via the intervention of EU-level state 
aid policies restricting investment promo-
tion strategies, or via EU-level insistence on 
promoting Lisbon type strategies where 
these are inappropriate to the developmen-
tal goals of less advanced regions (Ellison, 
2005b). 
The Commission’s SCF proposal for the 
2007–2013 Financial Perspective in fact 
distinguishes between the usefulness of Lis-
bon type strategies for the CEEC’s com-
pared to the OMS’s. While the Commission 
guidelines for regional policy urge states 
to earmark 60-75% of structural fund 
spending for Lisbon-compatible goals, this 
criterion was originally not intended to 
apply to the NMS’s.29 However, the final 
version of the 2007-2013 Financial Per-
spective requires all states to pursue Lis-
bon-style goals.30 As Jouen notes, the over-
lap between the use of SCF-funding and 
the Lisbon Agenda is strongest in regions 
that are more advanced, while regions 
that lag behind tend to employ more di-
verse strategies of economic development 
(2005: 7). Ellison (2005b) likewise finds 
that sectoral (as opposed to horizontal) 
type approaches to economic development 
tend to be far more pronounced in the 
less advanced states than elsewhere in the 
EU. 
The 2007–2013 Framework      
Perspective in context 
The EU’s multi-annual general Framework 
Perspectives concluded every seven years—
including the 2007–2013 Framework Per-
                                                 
29 See COM (2004) 487 final. 
30 See www.Euractiv.com: “Structural Funds get 
Lisbon Makeover” (July, 20th, 2006). 
spective—govern the overall distribution of 
EU funds across the Member states. The 
following analysis discusses the conclusion 
of the 2007–2013 Framework Perspective 
in the context of previous Framework Per-
spectives and the economic development 
interests of the NMS’s. While many have 
argued that the CEEC’s will be better off 
once they are EU members, the following 
provides an analysis of the degree to 
which distributional struggles related to 
innovation promotion as opposed to cohe-
sion/redistribution have pervaded the for-
mulation and conclusion of the 2007–2013 
Framework Perspective. This analysis con-
cludes that the development interests of 
the more advanced states have had a pro-
found impact on the EU’s distribution of 
resources and have had a negative impact 
on the share of resources made available 
to the NMS’s. 
The EU’s multi-annual Framework Per-
spectives continue to be governed by una-
nimity.31 Thus while any of the NMS’s 
theoretically have the right to block deci-
sions failing to meet with their expecta-
tions, the same is true for the more ad-
vanced states. While each Member state is 
in theory granted equal veto power, the 
relative voting power of individual Mem-
ber states is not necessarily one-to-one. 
States with more to lose from failed 
agreements (as from threats of exclusion) 
are more likely to make greater conces-
sions. Nor do the CEEC’s as a potential 
voting block constitute a force that could 
stop policy proposals in other areas of EU 
policy regulated by qualified majority vot-
ing (QMV).32 While it is beyond the pa-
rameters of this essay to discuss the issue 
of voting weights and relative power in 
                                                 
31 Recent attempts at EU institutional reform have 
not altered this fact. Though the Constitutional 
Treaty is now moribund, it should still be consid-
ered a reflection of the possible shape of future 
reform. 
32 While the CEEC’s will be able to constitute a 
“blocking minority” in an EU of 27 members, in 
an EU of 25 members, they are 13 votes shy of a 
blocking minority. Moreover, the now moribund 
Constitutional Treaty would have ensured that even 
in an EU of 27, the CEEC’s would remain many 
votes shy of a blocking minority. 
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more detail, an analysis of the conclusion 
of the 2007–2013 Financial Perspective 
provides an indication of the relative abil-
ity of the CEEC’s to pursue their interests 
in the New Europe. 
The initial Commission proposal for SCF 
expenditure published in February 2004 
was reasonably generous and went some 
way toward meeting CEE demands for 
equal treatment. A far greater share of 
spending was to be concentrated on the 
less developed economies and the Commis-
sion had proposed a 31% increase in 
overall SCF spending over the entire period 
(see Table 1; also Bachtler and Wishlade, 
2005: 6). By the conclusion of the Decem-
ber 2005 Summit under the UK presi-
dency, this was almost cut in half. One of 
the principal factors in this outcome was 
insistence from the net contributor states 
on restricting the total level of EU expen-
diture to approximately 1% of EU GNI.33 
Given the unwillingness, in particular of 
France, to allow further significant reduc-
tions in the CAP expenditure, a good 
share of the cuts came out of the Struc-
tural and Cohesion Fund category.34 
The Commission’s February 2004 pro-
posal foresaw a considerable shift in ex-
penditure from the structural and cohesion 
fund category to the Competitiveness, 
Growth and Employment category (Head-
ing 1A). As this category corresponds most 
closely to Lisbon Agenda type spending in 
the European Union, the original Financial 
Perspective proposal contained significantly 
larger potential transfers. This category 
would have more than doubled in size by 
the end of Financial Perspective 2007–
2013. While more significant reductions 
ultimately came out of Heading 1A in the 
final version of the Financial Perspective, 
                                                 
33 See the Joint Letter (December 15th, 2003), ftn. 
26. 
34 Though not surprising given both the relative 
political power of France in the European Union 
and historical precedent, significant French conces-
sions on CAP reform would have gone a long way 
to satisfying many of the demands from developing 
countries at the Doha Round of talks in the WTO. 
More thoroughgoing WTO and EU reforms have 
now been postponed until 2008 or later. 
this was paralleled by a significant drop 
in overall EU expenditure from 1.24% of 
EU GDP to approximately 1% of EU GDP. 
Thus what the larger more advanced net 
contributor states lose in EU expenditure is 
recouped through reductions in the EU 
budget. 
The country level distributions exhibit a 
significant rise in CEEC SCF funding for 
2007–2013 compared to the levels over 
the period 2004–2006. At the same time 
however, along with the overall downward 
push in total expenditure, there has like-
wise been a progressive upward creep in 
the number and size of individual alloca-
tions (special provisions and transitional 
arrangements) made to a broad range of 
Member States. The previous 4% of GDP 
threshold has been lowered still further 
(however slightly) and a number of coun-
tries have wrangled additional envelopes 
or transitional expenditures not present in 
prior drafts of the agreement. 
Despite resistance from the European 
Parliament (EP) to the final package de-
cided in December 2005, the final terms 
of the Inter-Institutional Agreement signed 
between the Council of the European Un-
ion and the EP only added 4 billion Euros 
to the total package. Just over 50% of this 
additional amount (2.1 billion Euros) was 
added to the budget of Heading 1A.35 In 
this regard, an institution typically known 
for favouring European integration has 
oddly come to the defense of the OMS’s.   
More telling perhaps is the juxtaposition 
of the final 2007–2013 Financial Perspec-
tive with its historical antecedents—in par-
ticular Delors Packages I and II.36 At that 
time, the old Cohesion countries (Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland) were able to 
achieve significant increases in EU SCF ex-
penditure—in particular due to the simul-
taneous pursuit of the Single Market and 
                                                 
35 See: “Mixed Emotions over EU Budget Deal” 
(www.Euractiv.com: Apr. 7, 2006). 
36 I draw here liberally from Szemlér (2005). 
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Table 1 
EU Budget for 2006 and Financial Perspective 2007–2013: February 2004 Proposal,  
December 2005 European Council Position and Final 2006 Totals 
(2004 prices) 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007-2013 
Structural and Cohesion Fund 
SCF's (February 2004) 38,791,000 47,570,000 48,405,000 49,120,000 49,270,000 49,410,000 50,175,000 50,960,000 344,910,000 
Percent Change  22.6% 1.8% 1.5% 0.3% 0.3% 1.5% 1.6% 29.6% 
SCF's (December 2005) 38,791,000 42,840,000 43,288,000 43,820,000 43,801,000 43,995,000 44,634,000 45,241,000 307,619,000 
Percent Change  10.4% 1.0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.4% 1.5% 1.4% 15.9% 
SCF's (April 2006) 38,791,000 42,863,000 43,318,000 43,862,000 43,860,000 44,073,000 44,723,000 45,342,000 308,041,000 
Percent Change  10.5% 1.1% 1.3% 0.0% 0.5% 1.5% 1.4% 16.2% 
Competitiveness, Growth and Employment 
C, G and E (Feb. 2004) 8,791,000 12,105,000 14,390,000 16,680,000 18,965,000 21,250,000 23,540,000 25,825,000 132,755,000 
Percent Change  37.7% 18.9% 15.9% 13.7% 12.0% 10.8% 9.7% 118.7% 
C, G and E (Dec. 2005) 8,791,000 8,250,000 8,860,000 9,510,000 10,200,000 10,950,000 11,750,000 12,600,000 72,120,000 
Percent Change  -6.2% 7.4% 7.3% 7.3% 7.4% 7.3% 7.2% 37.7% 
C, G and E (April 2006) 8,791,000 8,404,000 9,097,000 9,754,000 10,434,000 11,295,000 12,153,000 12,961,000 74,098,000 
Percent Change  -4.4% 8.2% 7.2% 7.0% 8.3% 7.6% 6.6% 40.5% 
Common Agricultural Policy 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007-2013 
CAP (February 2004) 56,015,000 57,180,000 57,900,000 58,115,000 57,980,000 57,850,000 57,825,000 57,805,000 404,655,000 
Percent Change  2.1% 1.3% 0.4% -0.2% -0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 3.2% 
CAP (December 2005) 56,015,000 54,972,000 54,308,000 53,652,000 53,021,000 52,386,000 51,761,000 51,145,000 371,245,000 
Percent Change  -1.9% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -9.0% 
CAP (April 2006) 56,015,000 54,985,000 54,322,000 53,666,000 53,035,000 52,400,000 51,775,000 51,161,000 371,344,000 
Percent Change  -1.8% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% -9.0% 
Sources:  own calculations based on appropriations data from Building Our Common Future (COM(2004) 101 final: p. 29), the UK Presidency Conclusions on the Fi-
nancial Perspective 2007–2013 (Doc 15915/05, CADREFIN 268, Dec. 19. 2005: Annex 1, p. 33), and the future budget of the European Union 
(http://ec.europa.eu/budget/prior_future/next_fin_framework_en.htm). Population data is from the Eurostat Online dataset. 
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EMU.37 The EU’s concurrent pursuit of 
important economic integration projects 
made it possible to leverage significant 
concessions on the SCF’s.  
A similar politically opportune context is 
lacking for the CEEC’s. Moreover, several 
years of slow economic growth in Western 
Europe along with a greater concentration 
of Regional Development funds on Central 
and East European countries appears to 
have diminished Western Europe’s appetite 
for greater SCF expenditure. Thus, the 
CEEC’s have been left with little bargaining 
room. While the NMS’s now enjoy full 
voting rights within the EU, they have not 
been able to achieve noteworthy conces-
sions. Moreover, under existing voting 
rules, this is not likely in the future unless 
parallel integration projects can be lever-
aged for greater concessions. While the 
project of constitutional reform looms on 
the horizon, it offers little opportunity to 
effectively claim—as did the creation of 
the Single Market and EMU—that deeper 
integration involves high costs for the less 
developed economies. Thus, for the time 
being at least, no similar integration pro-
ject of comparable magnitude is in sight. 
A quick thumbnail multiple regression 
analysis of the SCF allocations across the 
2000–2006 and 2007–2013 Framework 
Perspectives provides some methodological 
rigor to the above analysis.38 In addition 
to the explanatory variables adopted in 
Ellison (2005a)—level of economic devel-
opment (pcdgp), population (pop), unem-
ployment (un) and share of public support 
for European integration (pubsupp)—the 
following additional independent variables 
are tested: the number of Member states 
at the time the distribution is decided 
(numms) and a dummy variable for New 
and Old Member states to test for the 
role of region (region). The dependent 
variable is the total annual amount of 
funding an individual state is eligible to 
                                                 
37 See in particular Lange (1993). 
38 More complete information on methodology, 
variable selection and data sources is provided in 
Annex I. 
receive during the funding period.39 Sev-
eral multiple regression analyses are used 
to analyze the data.40 
The results of this analysis provide im-
portant. For one, the role of region loses 
significance in the 2007–2013 distribution 
compared to that of 2000–2006 (see Ta-
ble 2). In the first period, region has a 
strongly negative and highly significant ef-
fect of the SCF distribution—on average 
OMS’s received 2.234 billion Euros more 
than NMS’s. As illustrated in Ellison 
(2005a), the CEEC’s were strongly disad-
vantaged in the first years of EU member-
ship. This disadvantage disappeared in the 
2007–2013 period and there is a slight 
advantage for CEEC’s—on average NMS’s 
receive 394 million Euros more than 
OMS’s—though this coefficient is neither 
stable nor significant. While the Commis-
sion’s proposal was the least discriminatory 
across states—reflected by a very small 
coefficient on the region variable and no 
consistency in this finding across states—
the final 2007–2013 Framework Perspec-
tive tended to favour the NMS’s. However, 
the increase in funding for the NMS’s 
pales is comparison to the far higher 
amounts given to Western states during 
the 2000–2006 Framework perspective. 
Per capita GDP, public support and 
unemployment all begin to approach sig-
nificance and have a strong impact on the 
NMS distribution of funding under the 
2007–2013 Framework Perspective (in the 
previous period, only country size (popula-
tion) appeared to have any significant im-
                                                 
39 For the NMS’s, the annual amount is only calcu-
lated for the years of membership (2004–2006), as 
opposed to 2000–2006 for the OMS’s. Since not 
all states are able to make full use of the available 
EU funds, the total amount of funding states are 
eligible to receive may differ from the amounts 
they are able to put to use. 
40 The same basic caveats that applied to the 
analysis in Ellison (2005a) apply here. Since the 
unit of analysis is the country, this analysis is in-
adequately sensitive to regional variation—in par-
ticular in the level of economic development, un-
employment and public support for European inte-
gration. While cohesion funds are granted to 
states, structural funds are explicitly intended for 
regions. 
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pact on the distribution of funding). Oddly 
however, per capita GDP has the opposite 
effect from that predicted in the NMS’s 
while public support has the opposite ef-
fect from that expected in the OMS’s. The 
decision to allocate greater amounts of 
funding to the more advanced NMS’s may 
relate to their greater potential to absorb 
EU SCF-funding. Population—or country 
size—continues to be the single most pow-
erful explanatory variable across the 
NMS’s under the 2007–2013 Framework 
Perspective. Along with the unusually high 
degree of fit for the NMS regression 
model (93% of the variance is explained), 
this suggests that politics continues to play 
much less of a role in the distribution of 
SCF-funding in the NMS’s than in the 
OMS’s.  
The prediction that the number of 
Member states has a negative impact on 
total funding requires more attention. In 
the combined data, there is a positive 
though far from significant relationship 
between the number of member states and 
the allocation of EU funding. Each addi-
tional Member State adds approximately 
10.6 million Euros to the total budget. 
However, much of the change here can be 
explained by the large and statistically 
significant increase in funding for the 
NMS’s between the two periods. In gen-
eral, funding levels for the OMS’s have 
declined by almost the same amount rela-
tive to the number of Member states. This 
finding is commensurate with the intention 
of concentrating funding on the less de-
veloped states. However, as noted above, 
the increase in NMS funding pales in 
comparison to the dramatically preferential 
treatment of OMS’s under the 2000–2006 
Framework Perspective. Moreover, the 
relative impact of low levels of per capita 
GDP is surprisingly small and insignificant 
under the 2007–2013 Framework Perspec-
tive, suggesting that the OMS’s are again 
receiving large shares of SCF-funding 
compared to the NMS’s. 
Figures 1A and 1B below confirm these 
general findings. Figure 1A provides data 
on both the actual SCF allocations and 
predicted allocations41 based on the logic 
defined by the regression equation derived 
from the complete set of Member states 
for the 2007–2013 Framework Perspective. 
Seven OMS’s (Austria, Greece, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) 
received substantially more than they 
would have received had this logic been 
applied more consistently across all states. 
However, for the NMS’s the differences 
between the predicted and actual values 
are far more substantial. Apart from the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the 
NMS’s would have received significantly 
larger sums. 
Figure 1B is even more compelling. This 
figure provides data on both predicted 
allocations based on the logic defined by 
the regression equation derived from the 
OMS’s. In this case only five OMS’s (Aus-
tria, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden and the 
UK) received more than they would have 
had the 2000–2006 OMS logic been con-
sistently applied across all states. For the 
NMS’s, the differences between predicted 
and actual values are more substantial 
and—apart from the same three coun-
tries—the NMS’s generally would have re-
ceived larger shares of SCF-funding. How-
ever, in this case, what is most striking is 
the overall magnitude of funding that the 
NMS’s would have received. Based on the 
2000–2006 OMS logic, total funding 
amounts (compare the values on the y-axis 
in Figures 1A and 1B) would have been 
approximately twice as large as those allo-
cated according to the logic for the 2007–
2013 Financial Perspective. Comparing the 
2000–2006 OMS logic to actual (not pre-
dicted) figures for the 2007–2013 Financial 
Perspective, the NMS’s would have re-
ceived approximately 4.4 times more fund-
ing and the OMS’s approximately 18.7 
times less funding. 
                                                 
41 These predicted values and those that follow 
should be treated with some caution. While the 
goodness of fit is reasonably high when actual val-
ues for the NMS’s alone are regressed on the 
range of independent variables included here, it is 
substantially lower when considering the actual 
values only for the OMS’s or for all states (see the 
respective “adjusted r2” values in Table 2). 
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Table 2 
Explaining Variation in Structural and Cohesion Fund Allocations 2000–2006, 2007–2013 and Commission Proposal 
(2004) 
 
Framework Perspective 
2000–2006 Commission Proposal 2004 
Framework Perspective 
2007–2013 
Periods Combined  
(w/ Commission Prop.) 
 
ALL OMS NMS ALL OMS NMS ALL OMS NMS ALL OMS NMS 
Population 0.00005 (3.94) 
.00004 
(2.51) 
.0001 
(30.1) 
.00005 
(3.08) 
.00004 
(3.3) 
.0002 
(10.18) 
.00005 
(3.27) 
0.00003 
(3.03) 
.0002 
(9.67) 
.00005 
(5.91) 
.00004 
(4.91) 
.0002 
(12.57) 
Per capita GDP -42.3 (-2.87) 
-39.02 
(-2.07) 
-3.96 
(-1.03) 
-6.46 
(-0.53) 
-18.74 
(-2.15) 
27.12 
(1.62) 
-8.52 
(-0.77) 
-16.39 
(-1.94) 
26.66 
(1.87) 
-15.41 
(-2.23) 
-21.18 
(-3.31) 
22.36 
(2.11) 
Public Support 66.52 (2.70) 
79.3 
(2.38) 
-1.71 
(-0.45) 
20.59 
(0.82) 
47.68 
(2.31) 
-49.63 
(-2.28) 
31.63 
(1.25) 
37.25 
(1.96) 
-62.51 
(-1.86) 
37.72 
(2.75) 
51.69 
(3.75) 
-39.31 
(-2.56) 
Unemployment 54.48 (0.73) 
295.89 
(1.50) 
3.29 
(0.3) 
197.26 
(2.0) 
203.42 
(1.56) 
44.54 
(0.75) 
184.56 
(1.96) 
214.48 
(1.67) 
99.37 
(1.86) 
151.21 
(2.91) 
272.21 
(3.17) 
47.7 
(1.28) 
Region (E, W) -2234.59 (-2.43) - - 
-0.34 
(-0.0) - - 
394.87 
(0.43) - - 
-567.34 
(-1.03) - - 
# Member States - - - - - - - - - 10.61 (0.26) 
-52.84 
(-1.26) 
64.67 
(1.92) 
Commission - - - - - - - - - 24.26 (0.06) 
345.93 
(0.88) 
439.31 
(1.28) 
 
Adj. r2 0.65 0.67 0.99 0.42 0.72 0.92 0.48 0.67 0.93 0.52 0.7 0.88 
N 25 15 10 27 15 12 27 15 12 52 45 34 
Sources: See Annex. (t-statistics in parentheses). 
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Figures 1A and 1B: 
The discrimination gap revisited 
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DISCUSSION 
At least four issues will presumably re-
main at the centre of discussion in future 
reforms of EU redistributional politics. For 
one, contradictions between the redistribu-
tive, cohesion-producing and innovation 
promoting goals of EU regional develop-
ment and industrial policy clearly need to 
be worked out. In particular, a better 
understanding of which policy tools work 
best at different levels of subnational re-
gional economic development would be 
particularly helpful. Both policy approaches 
have positive features that should pre-
sumably be retained and improved.  
For another, future policy efforts need 
to resolve or improve upon the problem 
of variation in and balance between the 
interests of more and less developed states. 
As suggested herein, due to the increasing 
degree of concentration of SCF funds, ne-
glecting this problem may ultimately lead 
to the future withering away of EU SCF 
policy. Support for these policies—in par-
ticular in the context of slow growth in 
the European core economies—is likely to 
be eroded by domestic and national level 
interests in economic development in the 
more advanced states. However, accommo-
dations should ultimately not be made at 
the expense of the NMS’s. 
Third, the big question at the national 
and EU-level remains how best to distrib-
ute available funds to the sundry inter-
ested groups and parties and what politi-
cal, economic and social logic and institu-
tional structure should govern that distri-
bution. As suggested herein, current 
strategies of economic development are 
likely to create strong incentives to further 
centralize the control of EU SCF funding 
in the hands of central or state level gov-
ernments. This phenomenon—in particular 
to the extent that it is promoted by evolv-
ing EU-DGRegio policy strategies—is likely 
to give rise to significant domes-
tic/national-level struggles over the use 
and implementation of EU funding. Since 
these funding amounts are not insignifi-
cant, one can expect domestic national-
level political battles over funding to be-
come more pitched and feverish.  
It may be possible to resolve these is-
sues with more decisive approaches to the 
institutional management of regional devel-
opment funding. However, to some extent 
I remain agnostic on this point. Further 
political decentralization of the regional 
management of EU SCF-funding may po-
tentially result in a lower level of coordi-
nation with national-level objectives, having 
the potential impact of diminishing the 
benefits of such policies. Moreover, in 
many of the CEEC’s, commensurate re-
gional level political structures are either 
underdeveloped, rendering the further de-
centralization of administrative control 
problematic. On the other hand, increasing 
the degree of centralization is likely to 
have the opposite effect of distancing pol-
icy goals from regional needs and inter-
ests. There is a substantial literature sug-
gesting that the role of regional, subna-
tional information networks may be crucial 
to the success of regional development 
plans and projects. 
Finally, the ultimate challenge in the fu-
ture EU may well be the equitable and/or 
efficient distribution of resources between 
the more and less developed regions of 
Europe—irrespective or even devoid of the 
role of states. The real challenge in the 
future Europe may be how best to man-
age the competing interests of regions and 
less so of states. As this analysis suggests, 
the more advanced regions of Europe have 
very different interests in European gov-
ernance than the less developed regions of 
Europe. Increasing economic disparity 
across these regions—caused in part by 
the introduction of new and less developed 
Member states—only reinforces the likely 
rivalry of these competing interests. The 
re-nationalization of industrial and regional 
development policy—in particular in the 
more advanced states—provides one alter-
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native policy proposal for the New Europe. 
However, it is ultimately difficult to imag-
ine that the more advanced and savvy re-
gions and states would ultimately allow 
the potential economic management coor-
dination tool that European integration and 
EU-level decision-making capacity repre-
sents go to waste. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the inherently universalizing logic 
of globalization, economic space has at the 
same time become smaller, more local and 
taken on a distinctively sub-national, re-
gional character. As intimated several 
years ago in a trend-setting book The 
Second Industrial Divide,42 regional struc-
tures of economic development are gradu-
ally becoming more pronounced, a phe-
nomenon that is only likely to be intensi-
fied as European economic and political 
integration progresses. More and more, EU 
policy is beginning to reflect this shift in 
economic structure. The gradual paradigm 
shift outlined above has led states to lobby 
for reform, attempt to reduce overall ex-
penditure, limit the potential range of new 
member country benefits and possibly even 
to consider withdrawal from the Union.43 
While the declining cohesion of coordi-
nated market economies may explain some 
of this shift from redistribution to innova-
tion promotion, a more significant share is 
easily encompassed under the rubric of 
change in the strategic thinking about in-
dustrial and regional policy goals. 
Whether the costs of economic adjust-
ment can easily be overcome by the redis-
tributive transfer of resources from win-
ners to losers is rendered problematic both 
by thinking on the appropriate strategies 
                                                 
42 Piore and Sabel (1984). 
43 This is possibly at least one way of interpreting 
the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitu-
tional Treaty. 
to pursue in order to achieve greater lev-
els of economic development, as well as 
by the institutional and political structure 
in which such policies are created. The 
large and more advanced states—most of 
them net contributors to the EU budget—
and regions of Europe have lobbied hard 
both to increase the weight of Lisbon 
Agenda type spending in the EU and to 
reduce overall expenditures on the SCF. 
This notwithstanding, the transition from 
the 2000–2006 to the 2007–2013 Frame-
work Perspectives will benefit the NMS’s. 
At least for the next seven years, the Cen-
tral and East European countries will enjoy 
significantly higher expenditures than was 
the case for the first 3 years of EU mem-
bership (2004–2006). The (perhaps mar-
ginal) concentration EU structural and co-
hesion funding on the least advanced 
Member states ultimately means that the 
NMS’s will be the principal recipients for 
the upcoming framework period. Per per-
son, these states will on average receive 
237 Euros per year compared to 64 Euros 
per year for the OMS’s. What will happen 
with future framework periods is more 
complicated and depends both on how the 
European economy performs in the coming 
years and on how many states are able to 
gain membership status by 2014.  
Whether or not the allocations made to 
the NMS’s will be enough to compensate 
them for the costs of economic adjustment 
and the requirements of compliance with 
the EU regulatory framework is more 
problematic. The financial and regulatory 
demands of EU membership are significant 
and already several of the NMS’s (and 
some of the OMS’s) have been the target 
of the EU’s excessive budget deficit proce-
dure. Central and East European expendi-
tures on EU membership are high and the 
project of economic restructuring and ad-
justment is far from complete.  
The consequence is that distributional 
struggles are likely to test the limits of the 
New Europe for many years to come. As 
noted at the outset, the future conse-
quences of this general trend are difficult 
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to predict. As with all reforms and inno-
vations, the politics of European integra-
tion are likely to slow the process, leading 
to piecemeal, incremental change. On the 
one hand, it is possible that as the EU 
grows in size, its characteristic policy fea-
tures will gradually ‘wither away’, and the 
EU will look more and more like a trad-
ing club and much less like a political un-
ion.44 This outcome coincides broadly with 
conventional speculation about the contra-
dictions between widening and deepening. 
On the other hand, the alternative seems 
to be that EU regional policy will be 
gradually adapted to respond more 
strongly to the needs and interests of the 
more advanced EU Member states. The 
mechanism by which any of these out-
comes is likely to come about is that the 
more advanced states will lobby hard for 
reform of the existing status quo, attempt 
to reduce the overall share of expenditure 
in the EU, lobby to limit the future 
boundaries of the EU or ultimately even 
threaten to withdraw from the union. In 
some ways, all four of these outcomes 
seem to be occurring, though the severity 
of any rupture is greatly overstated. 
* * * * *
                                                 
44 For a contrasting viewpoint, see Kopstein and 
Reilly (2006). 
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ANNEX 
Dependent variables: 
Total Allocation of Structural and Cohesion 
Funds. All data used are annual amounts 
derived by dividing the total allocation by 
the appropriate number of years. All data 
are in millions of Euros at 2004 prices. 
∗ 2000–2006:  
1. European Commission, Working for 
the Regions:  
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/i
ntro/working4_en.htm). The figures 
for the NMS’s include the lump-
sum payments allocated with the 
accession agreement, see e.g.: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/arch
ives/pdf/enlargement_process/future
_prospects/negotiations/eu10_bulgari
a_romania/financial_framework_en.p
df. 
∗ 2004 Commission Proposal: 
2. Ostensibly from the European 
Commission.45 
∗ 2007–2013:  
3. Own calculation of total indicative 
allocations across categories (avail-
able in the Official Journal 
L243/34-36, L243/39-43, and 
L247/28-29; Sept. 6th and 9th, 
2006). 
Independent variables: 
∗ Population: Data is for the years 2001, 
2003 and 2004 (from the Eurostat 
online database). 
∗ Per capita GDP: real per capita GDP 
at PPP’s, data for the years 2001, 
2003 and 2004 (from the Eurostat 
online database). 
                                                 
45 Considerable secrecy surrounded these initial 
figures. The Commission table of proposed alloca-
tions used in this analysis stems from a private 
secondary source, but is almost identical to the 
table published in Jouen (2005: 29). At the time of 
the proposal, the Commission disavowed the exis-
tence of this table, or refused to make it public. 
∗ Public Support for EU membership: 
data is for the years 2002 (February), 
2004 (February) and 2005 (Oct.-Nov.) 
and has been taken from the Euro-
barometer (2004, 2005) and the Can-
didate Country Eurobarometer (2002). 
∗ Unemployment: Data is for the years 
2002, 2003 and 2004 (from the Euro-
stat online database). 
∗ Region: NMS=1, OMS=0 
∗ Number of Member States: 15 for the 
period 2000–2006 and the Commis-
sion’s 2004 proposal, 25 for the pe-
riod 2007–2013. The Commission’s 
proposal appeared in February, before 
the official date of membership in 
May, 2004. 
∗ Commission: if the proposal stems from 
the Commission, Commission=1, “0” if 
the proposal derives from a final 
agreement between the Council of Min-
isters and the EP. 
